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Abstract
In 1936, Stanislaw Jas´kowski [1] gave a construction of an interesting
sequence J0, J1, . . . of what he called “matrices”, which we would today
call “finite Heyting Algebras”. He then gave a very brief sketch of a proof
that if a propositional formula holds in every Ji then it is provable in
intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL). The sketch just describes a certain
normal form for propositional formulas and gives a very terse outline of
an inductive argument showing that an unprovable formula in the normal
form can be refuted in one of the Jk. Unfortunately, it is far from clear
how to recover a complete proof from this sketch.
In the early 1950s, Gene F. Rose [4] gave a detailed proof of Jas´kowski’s
result, still using the notion of matrix rather than Heyting algebra, based
on a normal form that is more restrictive than the one that Jas´kowski
proposed. However, Rose’s paper refers to his thesis [3] for additional
details, particularly concerning the normal form.
This note gives a proof of Jas´kowski’s result using modern terminol-
ogy and a normal form more like Jas´kowski’s. We also prove a semantic
property of the normal form enabling us to give an alternative proof of
completeness of IPL for the Heyting algebra semantics. We outline a
decision procedure for IPL based on our proofs and illustrate it in action
on some simple examples.
LetH = (H, f, t,⊓,⊔,→) be a Heyting algebra. We will define a new Heyting
algebra Γ(H) by adding a co-atom, i.e., a new element ∗ such that x < ∗ < t for
x ∈ H \ {t}. Γ(H) will extend H as a (f, t,⊓,→)-algebra and the join in Γ(H)
will agree with the join in H wherever possible. Thus, we choose some object
∗ = ∗H that is not an element of H and let Γ(H) = (H ∪ {∗}, f, t,⊓,⊔,→),
where the operations ⊓, ⊔ and → are derived from those of H as shown in
the operation tables below, in which x and y range over H \ {t} and where
α : H → (H \ {t}) ∪ {∗} satisfies α(x) = x for x 6= t and α(t) = ∗.
⊓ y ∗ t
x x ⊓ y x x
∗ y ∗ ∗
t y ∗ t
⊔ y ∗ t
x α(x ⊔ y) ∗ t
∗ ∗ ∗ t
t t t t
→ y ∗ t
x x→ y t t
∗ y t t
t y ∗ t
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Let B be the two-element Heyting algebra and, as usual, let us write Hi for
the i-fold power of a Heyting algebra H. Then define a sequence J0,J1, . . . of
finite Heyting algebras as follows:
J0 = B
Jk+1 = Γ(J
k+1
k )
We take the language L of intuitionistic propositional logic, IPL, to be
constructed from a set V = {P1, P2, . . .} of variables, the constants ⊥, ⊤, and
the binary connectives ∧, ∨ and ⇒. We do not take negation as primitive: ¬A
is an abbreviation for A ⇒ ⊥. The metavariables A,B, . . . ,M (possibly with
subscripts) range over formulas. E and F are reserved for formulas that are
either variables or ⊥. P,Q, . . . , Z range over variables. We assume known one
of the many ways of defining the logic of IPL and write IPL ⊢ A, if A is provable
in IPL. IPL has an algebraic semantics in which, given a Heyting algebra H
and an interpretation I : V → H , we extend I to a mapping vI : L → H by
interpreting ⊥, ⊤, ∧, ∨ and ⇒ as f, t, ⊓, ⊔ and → respectively. As usual we
write I |= A if vI(A) = t, H |= A if I |= A for every interpretation I : V → H
and |= A if H |= A for every Heyting algebra H. We assume known the fact
that IPL is sound with respect to this semantics in the sense that, if IPL ⊢ A,
then |= A. The converse statement, i.e., the completeness of IPL with respect
to the semantics is well-known, but we do not use it: in fact we will give an
alternative to the usual proofs.
We write A ⇔ B for (A ⇒ B) ∧ (B ⇒ A) and A[B/X ] for the result of
substituting B for each occurrence ofX in A. We have the following substitution
lemma:
Lemma 1 (substitution) For any formulas A, B and C and any variable X
we have:
(i) if IPL ⊢ C, then IPL ⊢ C[A/X ];
(ii) if IPL ⊢ A⇔ B, then IPL ⊢ C[A/X ]⇔ C[B/X ];
Proof: (i) is proved by induction on a proof of C. (ii) is proved by induction
on the structure of C.
We say a formula A is reduced if ⊤ does not appear in A as the operand of
any connective and ⊥ does not appear in A as the operand of any connective
other than as the right-hand operand of ⇒. Thus the only reduced formula
containing ⊤ is ⊤ itself.
Lemma 2 Any formula is equivalent to a reduced formula.
Proof: This follows by repeated use of the substitution lemma and the provable
equivalences ⊤ ∧A⇔ A, ⊥ ∧ A⇔ ⊥ etc.
We define a formula to be basic if it is reduced and is either a variable or
has one of the forms P ⇒ A or A⇒ P where P is a variable and A contains at
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most one connective. Thus a basic formula has one of the following forms1.
P P ⇒ Q P ⇒ Q ∧R P ⇒ Q ∨R P ⇒ Q⇒ R P ⇒ ¬Q
¬P P ∧Q⇒ R P ∨Q⇒ R (P ⇒ Q)⇒ R ¬P ⇒ Q
Note that if A is basic formula of a form other than P , (P ⇒ Q) ⇒ R or
¬P ⇒ Q, then VI(A) = t in any Heyting algebra under the interpretation I
that maps every variable to f. Our convention for the metavariables E and F
allows us to write, for example, (P ⇒ E)⇒ R as a metanotation for the forms
(P ⇒ Q)⇒ R and ¬P ⇒ R.
We say a formula is a basic context if it is reduced and is a conjunction of
one or more pairwise distinct basic formulas. We say a formula is regular if it is
an implication K ⇒ F where K is a basic context (and following our convention
F is a variable or ⊥).
We say A and B are equiprovable and write A ⊣⊢ B if IPL ⊢ A iff IPL ⊢ B.
Lemma 3 Every formula A is equiprovable with a regular formula M ⇒ Z such
that if H is any Heyting algebra and I is an interpretation in H with VI(M) = t,
then VI(A) ≤ VI(Z).
Proof: By Lemma 2, we may assume A is reduced. If A is ⊤, let Z be
any variable and let M :≡ Z, then A and M ⇒ Z are both provable and
hence they are equiprovable. If A is ⊥ or a variable, take M and Z to be
distinct variables, then neither A nor M ⇒ Z is provable, and hence they are
equiprovable. Otherwise, chose some variable Z that does not occur in A. Then
it is easy to see that A ⊣⊢ (A⇒ Z)⇒ Z (for the right-to-left direction, use the
substitution lemma to substitute A for Z). Our plan is to replace K :≡ A⇒ Z
by a basic context by “unnesting” all its non-atomic subformulas. Assume
K contains k non-atomic subformulas. Starting with K ≡ A1 ≡ B1 ◦1 C1,
enumerate the k non-atomic sub-formulas, A1 ≡ B1 ◦1 C1, . . . , Ak ≡ Bk ◦k Ck.
Choose fresh variables Pi, i = 1, . . . k. Define atomic formulas, Gi, Hi, for
i = 1, . . . , k as follows: Gi is Bi if Bi is atomic and is Pj if Bi is the j-th non-
atomic subformula; Hi is Ci if Ci is atomic and is Pj if Ci is the j-th non-atomic
subformula. Now define formulas L and M as follows:
L :≡
k∧
i=1
(Pi ⇔ (Gi ◦i Hi))
M :≡ P1 ∧ L
Recalling that B ⇔ C is just shorthand for (B ⇒ C) ∧ (C ⇒ B), and using
the fact that A and hence K are reduced, we see that M is a basic context, so
M ⇒ Z is regular.
We must show that K ⇒ Z ⊣⊢ M ⇒ Z. To see this, first assume IPL ⊢
K ⇒ Z. By induction on the size of the Ai, we have that IPL ⊢ L⇒ (Pi ⇔ Ai),
1 We elide brackets using the rules that ⇒ is right associative and that the connectives are
listed in increasing order of precedence as ⇔, ⇒, ∨, ∧, ¬.
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i = 1, . . . , k. Hence, as IPL ⊢ M ⇒ L, IPL ⊢ M ⇒ (P1 ⇔ A1), i.e., IPL ⊢
M ⇒ (P1 ⇔ K). As, clearly, IPL ⊢ M ⇒ P1, we have IPL ⊢ M ⇒ K and
then, as IPL ⊢ K ⇒ Z by assumption, we have IPL ⊢ M ⇒ Z. Conversely,
assume IPL ⊢ M ⇒ Z. Using the substitution lemma, we have also that
IPL ⊢ M [A1/P1, . . . , Ak/Pk] ⇒ Z, but M [A1/P1, . . . , Ak/Pk] is K ∧ L
′ where
L′ ≡ L[A2/P2, . . . Ak/PK ] is a conjunction of formulas of the form A⇔ A, hence
IPL ⊢ M [A1/P1, . . . , Ak/Pk] ⇔ K, and as IPL ⊢ M [A1/P1, . . . , Ak/Pk] ⇒ Z
we have that IPL ⊢ K ⇒ Z.
To prove M ⇒ Z satisfies the requirement about interpretations, assume
I is an interpretation such that VI(M) = t. Then for each i = 1, . . . , k, we
have VI(Pi ⇔ (Gi ◦i Hi)) = t, but this implies that VI(Pi) = VI(Gi ◦i Hi)
and hence, (by induction on the size of the Ai) that VI(Pi) = VI(Ai). In
particular, VI(P1) = VI(A1) and since we also have VI(P1) = t, we must have
VI(A1) = t. But by construction A1 ≡ A ⇒ Z, so VI(A ⇒ Z) = t, which
implies VI(A) ≤ VI(Z).
We now state and prove three lemmas whose purpose will become clear at
their point of use in the proof of our main theorem, Theorem 7.
Lemma 4 If B is a basic formula that is not of the form P or P ⇒ Q ∨ R
and P occurs in B, then IPL ⊢ P ∧B ⇔ P ∧ C where C has fewer connective
occurrences than B and is either a basic formula, an atom or a basic context
comprising a conjunction of two variables.
Proof: Routine using the fact that IPL ⊢ P ∧ B ⇔ P ∧ B[⊤/P ] (which may
be proved for arbitrary B by induction on the structure of B).
Lemma 5 If IPL ⊢ K ∧ A ∧ (B ⇒ C)⇒ B, then
IPL ⊢ ((K ∧ ((A⇒ B)⇒ C))⇒ D)⇔ (K ∧C ⇒ D).
Proof: ⇒: easy using IPL ⊢ C ⇒ ((A⇒ B)⇒ C).
⇐: the following gives the highlights of the natural deduction proof.
K ∧A ∧ (B ⇒ C)⇒ B [Given] (1)
K ∧C ⇒ D [Assume] (2)
K ∧ (B ⇒ C)⇒ A⇒ B [By (1)] (3)
K ∧ ((A⇒ B)⇒ C)⇒ A⇒ B [By (3)] (4)
K ∧ ((A⇒ B)⇒ C)⇒ C [By (4)] (5)
K ∧ ((A⇒ B)⇒ C)⇒ D [By (5) and (2)] (6)
(K ∧ C ⇒ D)⇒ ((K ∧ ((A⇒ B)⇒ C))⇒ D) [By (6), discharge (2)] (7)
Here in step (4) we use IPL ⊢ ((A⇒ B)⇒ C)⇒ (B ⇒ C).
Lemma 6 Let B be a basic formula that is not a variable and let I be an
interpretation in a non-trivial Heyting algebra H such that VI(B) = t. Let α :
H → (H \ {t})∪ {∗H} be as in the definition of Γ(H). Define an interpretation
J in Γ(H) by J = α ◦ I.
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(i) If B does not have the form (P ⇒ E)⇒ R then VJ(B) = t.
(ii) If B has the form (P ⇒ E) ⇒ R, and if in addition VI(P ) = VI(E ⇒
R) = t while VI(E) 6= t, then also VJ(B) = t.
Proof: (i): This is easily checked for the case P ⇒ E and for the cases P ◦ Q⇒
R and P ⇒ Q ◦ R when ◦ ∈ {∧,∨}. In the remaining case B ≡ P ⇒ Q ⇒ E.
As B is equivalent to P ∧Q⇒ E, we have already covered the case when E is a
variable, while if E is⊥, VJ(B) = α(p)⊓α(q) → f, where p = I(P ) and q = I(Q),
but then, by inspection of the operation tables, we have α(p) ⊓ α(q) = p ⊓ q
unless p = q = t, but as H is non-trivial and VI(B) = t, the case p = q = t
cannot arise.
(ii): we have VJ (B) = (α(p) → α(e)) → α(r), where p = VI(P ), e = VI(E)
and r = VI(R). By assumption, p = t and e 6= t, so α(p) = ∗ and α(e) = e, hence
α(p) → α(e) = ∗ → e = e, so that VJ (B) = e → α(r) which is e → ∗ = t, if
r = t, and is e→ r otherwise, in which case, as we are given that VI(E ⇒ R) = t,
we have e→ r = VI(E ⇒ R) = t.
To state our main theorem, we define an interpretation I to be a strong
refutation of a formula of the form K ⇒ C, if VI(K) = t while VI(C) 6= t.
Theorem 7 Let A ≡ K ⇒ F be a regular formula (so that F is either a variable
or ⊥), let K ≡ B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bk display K as a disjunction of basic formulas and
let d = d(A) be the number of Bi of the form (P ⇒ E) ⇒ R. Either IPL ⊢ A
or A has a strong refutation in Jd.
Proof: The proof is by induction on the sum s(A) = c(A)+d(A)+v(A), where
c(A) is the number of connective occurrences in K, d(A) is as in the statement
of the theorem and v(A) is the number of conjuncts of K comprising a single
variable.
Case (i): v(A) = d(A) = 0: in this case, the interpretation in J0 = B that
maps every variable to f is easily seen to be a strong refutation of A (which is
therefore unprovable, by the soundness of IPL).
Case (ii): v(A) > 0: in this case at least one Bi is a variable. If all the Bi are
variables and if Bi 6≡ F for any i, then A has strong refutation such that I(Bi) =
t, i = 1, . . . , k and VI(F ) = f. Otherwise, rearranging the Bi if necessary, we
may assume that K ≡ P ∧ L where P is a variable and L ≡ B2 ∧ . . . ∧ Bk. If
P ≡ F , we are done: F ∧ L ⇒ F is provable. If P 6≡ F and P does not occur
in L, then it is easy to see that A ⊣⊢ A′ where A′ :≡ L⇒ F . As s(A′) < s(A),
by induction, if IPL 6⊢ L⇒ F , we can find a strong refutation I of L⇒ F , but
then, because P does not occur in L ⇒ F , by adjusting I if necessary to map
P to t we obtain a strong refutation of A. If P occurs in L, let us rearrange the
Bi again so that K ≡ P ∧ B ∧M where M ≡ B3, . . . , Bk and P occurs in B.
If B does not have the form P ⇒ Q ∨ R, then, by Lemma 4, we may replace
P ∧ B by an equivalent formula P ∧ C where C is either a basic formula, an
atom or a basic context comprising a conjunction of two variables and contains
fewer connectives then B. If C is ⊥, A is provable and we are done. Otherwise,
we may replace A by the equivalent regular formula A′ :≡ P ∧ C ∧M ⇒ F
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(or P ∧M ⇒ F , if C is ⊤) and we are done by induction, since s(A′) < s(A).
If B has the form P ⇒ Q ∨ R, then IPL ⊢ P ∧ B ∧ M ⇔ K ′ ∨ K ′′ where
K ′ :≡ P ∧Q∧M and K ′′ :≡ P ∧R ∧M , and hence IPL ⊢ A⇔ A′ ∧A′′ where
A′ :≡ K ′ ⇒ F and A′′ :≡ K ′′ ⇒ F . If A is not provable, then one of A′ and A′′
is not provable, in which case, as s(A′) < s(A) and s(A′′) < s(A), by induction
we have a strong refutation in Jd of either A
′ or A′′ and this will also strongly
refute A.
Case (iii): v(A) = 0 and d = d(A) > 0: Let X = {j1, . . . , jd} be the
set of i such that Bi has the form (P ⇒ E) ⇒ R. For each i ∈ X , let
Ki :≡ B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bi−1 ∧ Bi+1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bk and let Pi, Ei and Ri be such that
Bi ≡ (Pi ⇒ Ei)⇒ Ri. We now have two subcases depending on the provability
of the formulas Ci :≡ Ki ∧ Pi ∧ (Ei ⇒ Ri)⇒ Ei:
Subcase (iii)(a): for some i ∈ X , IPL ⊢ Ci: By Lemma 5, A, which is
equivalent to Ki ∧ ((Pi ⇒ Ei)⇒ Ri)⇒ F , is equivalent to A
′ :≡ Ki ∧Ri ⇒ F .
As s(A′) < s(A), we are done by induction.
Subcase (iii)(b): for every i ∈ X , IPL 6⊢ Ci: By induction, as s(Ci) < s(A)
and d(Ci) = d − 1, for each i ∈ X there is an interpretation Ii in Jd−1 that
strongly refutes Ci, i.e., Ki∧Pi∧(Ei ⇒ Ri)⇒ Ei. Now define an interpretation
I in Jdd−1, by I(U) = (Ij1 (U), . . . , Ijd(U)). Then VI(Bi) = t for i = 1, . . . , k
(because, for i ∈ X , VIi(Pi) = VIi(Ei ⇒ Ri) = t and Bi ≡ (Pi ⇒ Ei) ⇒ Ri).
But then applying Lemma 6 to I gives us an intepretation J in Jd = Γ(J
d
d−1)
that strongly refutes A.
Corollary 8 Let A ≡ K ⇒ F be a regular formula and let d be the number of
conjuncts of K of the form (P ⇒ E)⇒ R. Then IPL ⊢ A iff Jd |= A.
Proof: Immediate from the theorem given the soundness of IPL for the Heyting
algebra semantics.
Corollary 9 IPL is complete for the Heyting algebra semantics.
Proof: Assume |= A. We have to show that IPL ⊢ A. Consider the regular
formula A′ ≡M ⇒ Z such that A ⊣⊢ A′ whose existence is given by Lemma 3.
If IPL 6⊢ A, then IPL 6⊢ A′, whence by the theorem, A′ has a strong refutation
in Jk for some k, i.e., an interpretation I in Jk such that VI(M) = t, but
VI(Z) < t. But then Lemma 3 gives us that VI(A) ≤ VI(Z) < t, so I 6|= A
contradicting our assumption that |= A.
Corollary 10 IPL has the finite model property.
Proof: It is immediate from the theorem and soundness that a refutable regular
formula has a refutation in a finite model. Argue as in the proof of Corollary 9
to reduce the general case to the case of regular formulas.
If H0,H1, . . . is a sequence of Heyting algebras, let us define
⊙
k Hk to
be the subalgebra of
∏
k Hk comprising sequences (p0, p1, . . .) such that for all
sufficiently large k, the pk are either all f or all t. Our final corollary shows
that there is countably infinite Heyting algebra J, such that for any formula φ,
J |= φ iff IPL ⊢ φ.
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Corollary 11 For any formula A, IPL ⊢ A iff J |= A, where J =
⊙
k Jk.
Proof: The left-to-right direction is just the soundness of IPL for Heyting
algebras. For the right-to-left direction argue as in the proof of Corollary 9 and
note that a refutation in Jd gives a refutation in the subalgebra of J comprising
the sequences (p0, p1, . . .) such that pi is constant for i > d.
The statement of Theorem 7 leads to a decision procedure for IPL that
involves a search through all interpretations of a formula in one of the Jd for a
certain d. As Rose [4] observes, the size of the Jk grows very rapidly with k, so
this decision procedure is impractical. However, the proof of the theorem leads
to a much better algorithm: given any formula A, we first apply the algorithm
of Lemma 3 if necessary to convert A into an equiprovable regular formula and
then follow the case analysis of the proof of the theorem: if we are in Case (i),
A is unprovable and we are done; if we are in Case (ii), the proof shows us
how to produce one or two simpler formulas whose conjunction is equivalent
to A and we may proceed recursively to decide these formulas; if we are in
Case (iii), we can derive the formulas Ci described in the proof and decide
them recursively; if any Ci is provable, we are in Subcase (iii)(a) and we may
replace A by an equivalent and simpler formula that we can decide recursively;
if no Ci is provable, we are in Subcase (iii)(b) and A is unprovable. If A is
unprovable, then the proof ot the theorem yields an explicit refutation in one of
the Jk. In the appendix, we show some example calculations using this decision
procedure. We make no claim that the decision procedure is practical on large
examples: its time complexity involves a factor d!, where d is bounded below by
the number of implications in the input formula.
Jas´kowski’s construction was used by Tarski to show the completeness of
intuitionistic propositional logic for its topological interpretation [5]. One imag-
ines that Jas´kowski’s proof was well known to Polish logicians in the 1930s, but
sadly the details have been lost: by the 1950s, Kleene’s student Gene F. Rose
had to reinvent a proof. The proof of Theorem 7 given here and, in particular,
its use of Lemma 5 is largely due to Rose [3, 4]. Rose’s analogue of our notion of
basic formula admits only 6 forms: P , ¬P , P ⇒ Q, P ⇒ Q∨R, P ∧Q⇒ R and
(P ⇒ Q)⇒ R). To prove his analogue of our Lemma 3 involves a lengthy case
analysis, whereas our more liberal notion of basic formula admits the simpler
and more intuitive proof given here. As far as I know, the observations that
Theorem 7 leads to an alternative proof of the completeness of IPL and that
its proof leads to a syntax-driven decision procedure for IPL are new.
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Appendix: examples of the decision procedure
Throughout the examples “Case” and “Subcase” refer to the proof of Theorem 7.
We use the following tabular format for the regular formulas B1 ∧ . . .∧Bk ⇒ F
that occur as the goals we are trying to decide:
B1, . . . , Bk
F
Example 1: A :≡ (P ∨Q) ∧ ¬Q⇒ P
Noting that A already has the form B ⇒ Q, we can skip the first step in
the algorithm of Lemma 3 and simply “unnest” B. Listing the subformulas of
(P ∨2 Q) ∧1 ¬3Q as shown by the subscripts, our initial goal is:
P1, P1 ⇔ P2 ∧ P3, P2 ⇔ P ∨Q,P3 ⇔ ¬Q
P
We are in Case (ii) and we replace the occurrence of P1 in P1 ⇔ P2 ∧ P3 by ⊤
and simplify giving;
P1, P2, P3, P2 ⇔ P ∨Q,P3 ⇔ ¬Q
P
We are again in Case (ii), but now P2 appears in a subformula of the form
P2 ⇒ P ∨Q and replacing P2 by ⊤ in that formula gives us two subgoals:
P1, P2, P3, P, P3 ⇔ ¬Q
P
P1, P2, P3, Q, P3 ⇔ ¬Q
P
Both subgoals are in Case (ii). In the first, the succedent of the goal appears
in the antecedent while in the second, replacing first P3 and then Q by ⊤ in
P3 ⇔ ¬Q and simplifying gives the antecedent ⊥. So both subgoals and hence
also our original formula are provable.
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Example 2: Peirce’s law: A :≡ ((P ⇒ Q)⇒ P )⇒ P
A is already regular, so we take it as our initial goal:
(P ⇒ Q)⇒ P
P
We are in Case (iii) and our next step is to decide the goal:
P,Q⇒ P
Q
This is in Case (ii) and replacing P by ⊤ in Q⇒ P and simplifying leads to
P
Q
This is again in Case (ii) and is refuted by the interpretation {P 7→ t, Q 7→ f}.
Following Lemma 6, this lifts to the refutation {P 7→ ∗, Q 7→ f} of Peirce’s law
in J1 = B ∪ {∗}.
Example 3: prelinearity: A :≡ (P ⇒ Q) ∨ (Q⇒ P )
Following the first part of Lemma 3, we replace A by the equiprovable formula
(A⇒ Z)⇒ Z and list its subformulas as indicated by the subscripts in ((P ⇒3
Q) ∨2 (Q⇒4 P )⇒1 Z)⇒ Z. This gives us the following initial goal:
P1, P1 ⇔ P2 ⇒ Z, P2 ⇔ P3 ∨ P4, P3 ⇔ P ⇒ Q,P4 ⇔ (Q⇒ P )
Z
This is in Case (ii) and replacing P1 by ⊤ in P1 ⇔ P2 ⇒ Z and simplifying we
get:
P1, P2 ⇒ Z, P2 ⇔ P3 ∨ P4, P3 ⇔ P ⇒ Q,P4 ⇔ (Q⇒ P )
Z
This is now in Case (iii) with d = 2. This leads to two subgoals:
C1:
P1, P2 ⇒ Z, P2 ⇔ P3 ∨ P4, P3 ⇒ P ⇒ Q,P4 ⇔ (Q⇒ P ), P,Q⇒ P3
Q
C2:
P1, P2 ⇒ Z, P2 ⇔ P3 ∨ P4, P3 ⇔ P ⇒ Q,P4 ⇒ (Q⇒ P ), Q, P ⇒ P4
P
Either continuing to follow Theorem 7 or by inspection, we find the following
strong refutations of these subgoals in B.
C1: ({P, P1, P2, P4, Z} × {t}) ∪ ({Q,P3} × {f})
C2: ({Q,P1, P2, P3, Z} × {t}) ∪ ({P, P4} × {f})
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Combining these we should obtain a refutation I = {P 7→ (t, f), Q 7→ (f, t)} of
A in Γ(B2) ⊆ J2. And, indeed, in Γ(B
2) we have:
((t, f)→ (f, t)) ⊔ ((f, t)→ (t, f)) = (f, t) ⊔ (t, f)
= α((f, t) ⊔B2 (t, f))
= α((t, t)) = ∗ 6= t.
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